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Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: 
A Response to Twiqbal Apologists 






Professor Stephen Yeazell once wrote, ''A society based on the rule of law fails in one of 
its central premises if substantial parts of the population lack access to law enforcement 
institutions."" One apparent threat to access to justice in recent years has been the 
erosion of notice pleading in the federal courts in favor of a plausibility-pleading system 
that screens out potentially meritorious claims that fail to offer sufficient specificity and 
support at the pleading stage. But some have questioned whether this purported threat 
is more perceived than real. Indeed, this doctrinal shift has been defended in several 
ways that each suggest-in their own way-that the critical response to Twombly and 
Iqbal may be much ado about little or nothing. 
These apologies for the doctrinal shift, if you will, generally fall into three categories. 
The first consists of arguments suggesting that the standard has not really changed 
at all, which I will refer to as the "consistency" defense. The second group concedes 
that there has been a change but argues that the change has not had or will not have a 
substantial impact; I will call this the "inconsequentiality" defense. The final category 
contains those arguments asserting that the changes are consequential but in a good 
way, meaning that the strengthening of pleading standards was warranted and will be 
beneficial to the litigation system. I refer to this type of argument as the "efficiency" 
defense. 
This essay responds to each of these apologies, finding that the consistency defense 
is doctrinally unsound, that the inconsequentiality defense is doubtful (if not 
counterfactual), and that the efficiency defense is misguided, given the patent 
overinclusiveness and subjectivity of the plausibility doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[T]he lawsuit is to vindicate rules of substantive law, not rules of 
pleading, and the latter must always yield to the former. 
-Charles Clark1 
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bel/Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcreftv. Iqbal,3 there was quite an uproar.4 Not only did the Court sidestep the 
established rule amendment process to produce a novel rule of pleading5 ( overturn­
ing Conley v. Gibson6 in the process), but the rule it announced was particularly 
pernicious for its overinclusiveness,7 subjectivity,8 and disruptiveness.9 Although 
many commentators have remarked on and studied the effects of these two cases 
1. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 60 (2d ed. 1947). 
2. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
3. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
4. See, e.g., Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt far Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental 
Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 571 (2012) ("Ashcrqft v. Iqbal is an embarrassment to the American 
Judicial System in which a majority of the Supreme Court chose to reject the rule oflaw." (footnote 
omitted)); see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal· A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules cf Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 & n.52, 16 (2010) (citing examples of those observers 
who "believe these two cases represent a major departure from the Court's established pleading 
jurisprudence"). 
5. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 453-54 (2008) (criticizing the 
Court for circumventing the formal rule amendment process, which it has previously suggested was 
the more appropriate means of redressing concerns with the general pleading standard set forth in 
Rule 8(a)(2)); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) ('To the extent that the 
court was concerned with this procedural issue, our cases demonstrate that questions regarding 
pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either 
by the rulemaking process or the legislative process."). 
6. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
7. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009) (''It 
seems, then, that plausibility pleading is overinclusive in that it potentially keeps valid claims from 
entering the system."). 
8. See id at 9 -11 (describing how the Twombly doctrine's use of imprecise "[c]oncepts such as 'more 
than labels and conclusions,' 'above the speculative level,' 'plausible grounds to infer,' 'enough factual 
matter to suggest,' 'reasonable expectation,' and 'enough heft'" render the doctrine "too subjective to 
yield predictable and consistent results across cases"). 
9. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010) ('The headline need no longer equivocate after two recent U.S. 
Supreme Court cases: Pleading Left Bleeding. The Court has revolutionized the law on pleading. 
Litigators (and procedure scholars) have taken note of the Court's fresh pair of decisions, the 
suggestive Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and the definitive Ashcrqft v. Iqbal But these decisions do 
more than redefine pleading rules. By inventing a new and foggy test for the threshold stage of 
every lawsuit, they have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation." (footnotes omitted)). 
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from critical perspectives, others have responded from less critical or even sup­
portive perspectives. These pro-Twombly/Iqbal views generally fall into one of 
three categories. 
The first group of supporters maintains that the Twombly and Iqbal deci­
sions did not fundamentally change pleading doctrine but rather were consistent 
with the doctrine as traditionally understood or intended.10 Thus, in their view, 
Twombly and Iqbal properly articulated the level of specificity that Rule 8(a) has 
always required ( or intended) of claimants and the two cases ( or at least 
Twombly )11 were rightly decided.12 I will refer to this perspective as the consistency 
defense. 
A second set of responses has focused less on the nature of any doctrinal 
change and more on the impact of these two cases, concluding that the impact is 
negligible if not nonexistent. This perspective has been buttressed by research on 
motion to dismiss outcomes pre- and post-Twombly and Iqbal tending to show 
little-to-no increase in grant rates in the aggregate.13 I will label this position the 
inconsequentiality defense. 
Finally, there are those who acknowledge that the Supreme Court's deci­
sions have changed pleading doctrine but argue that the change is for the better. 
Under this view, the Supreme Court was right to identify discovery expense and 
10. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation if Court Access, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 873, 877 (2009) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision in Twombly does not alter pleading rules 
in as drastic a way as many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose."); id. at 890 
("[I]t is wrong to condemn Twombljs plausibility standard for being inconsistent with the language 
of Rule 8(a)(2) or the intent of the 1938 Advisory Committee."). 
11. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised.· A Comment on Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 851 (2010) ("A clear understanding of the differences 
between Iqbal and Twombly makes it possible to consider Twombljs virtues without the taint of 
Iqba!s vices."); Luke Meier, Why Twombly Is Good Law (but Poorly Drafted) and Iqbal Will Be 
Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. 709 (2012) (defending Twombly while criticizing Iqbal). Justice Souter can 
certainly be described as someone who would defend Twombly but criticize Iqbal, since this is 
precisely what he did by authoring the Twombly opinion but then filing a dissent in Iqbal. See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 695-99 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing his disagreement 
with the Iqbal majority but affirming his commitment to Twombly). 
12. See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1299 (2010) 
("[P]roperly understood, the post-Iqbal pleading framework is not fundamentally in conflict with 
notice pleading . . . .  "). 
13. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES vii (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FJC STUDY], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Publications/motioniqbal.pdf ('There 
was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated 
the case." (citation omitted)). 
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abuse as real problems ansmg from loose pleading standards; without the 
screening that plausibility pleading provides, plaintiffs with unsubstantiated claims 
will be able to access costly discovery, which could potentially extort undeserved 
settlements from defendants.14 Further, this group sees Twombly and Iqbal as 
increasing efficiency in the system, by permitting the elimination of invalid claims 
at the outset before judicial resources and litigant time and expense are taxed. 15 I 
will refer to this last position as the efficiency defense.16 
This essay addresses these Twombly and Iqbal (or "Twiqba!') apologies, 
concluding that each has its flaws. The adherents to the consistency defense 
simply misunderstand (or misstate) the status quo ante. No plausible (pun 
intended) view of our past under Rule 8(a) as originally written and intended, or as 
subsequently interpreted and applied, could conclude that Twombly and Iqbal 
were in sync with the Rule 8(a) we all came to know and love (or loathe) . The 
inconsequentiality perspective is undercut by the unsoundness of the evaluative 
methods on which it is based, focusing on facile pre- and post-Twiqbal grant rate 
comparisons without taking into account the larger picture involving litigant 
behavioral change and how revision of the pleading standard affects the assertion 
of claims and the incidence of dismissal challenges. Finally, the efficiency view is 
misguided because (1) it is based on the positing of a problem-discovery abuse­
that has not been confirmed to exist, and (2) the remedy that Twombly and Iqbal 
have delivered to address the ailments that efficiency proponents lament is poorly 
calibrated for the task, being grossly subjective and overinclusive in ways that 
ensnare meritorious claims in their grasp. Each of these responses to Twiqbal 
apologists will be fleshed out more below. 
I. Tl-IE CONSISTENCY DEFENSE 
The consistency defense of Twombly and Iqbal has three variants. The first 
holds that Twombly and Iqbal track how lower courts were already interpreting 
14. The Court itself expressed this perspective when it wrote, "[t]he requirement of allegations sug­
gesting an agreement serves the practical purpose of preventing a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless 
claim' from 'tak[ing] up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing 
an in ter orem increment of the settlement value."' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 
(2007) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
15. Adam Steinman helpfully cites to some of the staunch defenders of Iqbal from this perspective in a 
recent article on post-Iqbal pleading doctrine. See Steinman, supra note 12, at 1297 n.13. 
16. Other groups responding to Twombly and Iqbal in a sympathetic way could include those who feel 
it is too soon to evaluate the cases or those who believe that one or both of the cases reached the 
right result but unnecessarily butchered the doctrine in the process. 
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and applying Rule 8(a) and thus are consistent with the reality of pleading on 
the ground. 17 This variant is the easiest to address because it is largely beside the 
point. The issue is whether the Supreme Court revised pleading doctrine in 
Twombly and Iqbal. The mere fact that some lower courts had already moved 
in such a direction does not speak to where the Supreme Court stood on the mat­
ter. Certainly, if there were circuits that could fairly be described as imposing a 
plausibility pleading standard prior to Twombly, then life in those circuits may not 
have changed radically. But again, the question is whether plausibility pleading is 
a revision to the Supreme Court's understanding of the requisites of Rule 8(a)(2) ; 
no amount of circuit court prescience in moving to such an approach beforehand 
can supplant the need to address that question directly. To the extent that 
Twiqbal defenders hold that the previous embrace of heightened pleading by 
lower courts will mitigate the impact of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, that 
point will be addressed in Part II below. 
The second version of the consistency defense argues that nothing has 
changed beyond the language we use to describe the pleading standard.18 The 
Court itself included rhetoric suggestive of this position in the Twombly and Iqbal 
opinions when it wrote, "[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of 
specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face. "19 However, elsewhere in its opinion the Court confirmed that a meaningful 
change of some kind had come. For starters, it "retired" the "no set of facts" 
standard of Conley v. Gibson, which had previously held that "a complaint should 
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
17. See, e.g., Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing Afte, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. 
L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (suggesting the Twombljs plausibility showing is consistent with the standard 
already used in more than half the circuits, that "a complaint . . .  contain either direct or inferential 
allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal 
theory" (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed 
sub n om. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Lyman Lamb Co., 462 U.S. 1125 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
18. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, EvenAfte, Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 484-
85 (2010) ("Courts have long held that legal conclusions need not be accepted as true on 12(b)(6) 
motions, have long insisted that pleaders are not entitled to unreasonable factual inferences, and 
have long treated 'legal conclusions,' 'unwarranted deductions,' 'unwarranted inferences,' 
'unsupported conclusions,' and 'sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations' as 
'more or less synonymous' terms. So understood, Twombljs insistence that the inference of 
conspiracy be 'plausible' is equivalent to the traditional insistence that an inference be 'reasonable."' 
(footnote omitted)). 
19. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. 
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to relief "20 That was no small thing, given how that standard was ensconced in 
pleading doctrine.21 Were it the case that the Court was not revising the doctrine 
in a significant way, there would be no need to abrogate the Conley approach and 
supplant it with plausibility. Next, the standard the Court announced­
plausibility-had never before been articulated in the Rule 8(a) context; the 
requirement of a statement showing "plausible" entitlement to relief is undeniably 
an innovation as much as it was when the concept was inserted into the summary 
judgment analysis.22 But perhaps most telling is the Court's articulation of its 
motivation for the plausibility interpretation-the forestalling of discovery abuse 
that the Conley approach would (in its view) continue to facilitate.23 Clearly, if 
Twombly simply reflected a change in terminology, the Court would not have 
needed to refer to these concerns in support of its imposition of the plausibility 
requirement. The lower courts are certainly acknowledging a change;24 why not 
the Court? One can only speculate, but conceding a wholesale revision of the 
meaning of Rule 8(a) and what it requires would run embarrassingly counter to 
the Court's own prior unequivocal admonition that such judicial amendment of a 
rule would be an improper circumvention of the Rules Enabling Act process.25 
The third variation of the consistency defense argues that although the 
Court was changing the prevailing understanding of the general pleading stan-
20. Id at 561 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). 
21. See Spencer, supra note 5, at 436-39 (describing the Court's unwavering support for the Conley 
decision over a fifty-year period). 
22. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596 (1986) ("[T]he absence 
of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a 'genuine 
issue for trial' exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e)."). 
23. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 ("[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants 
to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only by 
taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to 
avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasonably founded hope 
that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support a § 1 claim." (second 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
24. See, e.g., Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.3 ( 4th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Twombly standard is 
even more favorable to dismissal of a complaint."); Geller v. Von Hagens, No. 8: 10-CIV-1688-
EAK-AEP, 2010 WL 4867540, at *2 (MD. Fla. Nov. 23, 2010) ("At the outset it should be noted 
that Iqbal and Twombly significantly changed the pleading standard required previously."). 
25. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-
69 (1993) ("Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under§ 
1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(6). But that is a result 
which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial 
interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment, federal courts and litigants must rely on 
summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than 
later."); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). 
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<lard that had developed over time, it was being true to the original meaning of 
Rule 8(a), and the plausibility interpretation is wholly consistent with the 
language and the spirit of Rule 8(a) .26 Under this view, Rule 8(a) was written to 
require a "showing" of "entitlement to relief'-saying nothing of notice-and 
jurists around the time of its adoption and for years thereafter maintained that 
specific rather than overly liberal pleading was required under the Rule.27 Two 
assumptions seem built into this perspective. The first is that the status quo prior 
to Twombly was a pure notice pleading regime in which one could get into court 
on the barest of allegations;28 the second is that plausibility pleading requires only 
the offering of a factual narrative that, if assumed true, would entitle the pleader 
to relief.29 In other words, this iteration of the consistency position requires that 
pre-Twombly pleading doctrine be caricatured into a straw man not reflective of 
what pleading doctrine really entailed and that post-Twombly pleading doctrine be 
redefined into something less than it  truly is-both counterfactual assumptions. 
No one seriously believed prior to Twombly that one could get into court with a 
bare allegation naming the parties and baldly asserting harm.3° Further, 
Twombly-supplemented by Iqbal--can hardly be minimized to having wrought 
only the need for a factual narrative showing entitlement to relief Such an 
26. See Bone, supra note 10, at 890 ("[I]t is wrong to condemn Twomb!ys plausibility standard for being 
inconsistent with the language of Rule 8(a)(2) or the intent of the 1938 Advisory Committee."); 
Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution if a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV. 
1053, 1055 (2009) ("[I]t is a decision that is consistent with the text of Rule 8, giving effect to 
language that in the past had often lain dormant."). 
27. Bone, supra note 10, at 892 ("[Rule 8(a)(2)] does not refer to notice pleading explicitly . . .  . 
Moreover, not everyone agreed that the federal standard should be very liberal notice pleading . . .  . 
U]urists and politicians sharply divided on the pleading issue, some insisting that specific pleading 
was essential to properly framing the lawsuit and rendering it manageable."). 
28. This assumption was apparent in both of the Supreme Court's decisions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces . . .  demands more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation."); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 ("On 
such a focused and literal reading of Conlejs 'no set of facts,' a wholly conclusory statement of claim 
would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff 
might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." (alteration in original)). 
29. Bone, supra note 10, at 893 ('What is clear is that the Committee intended to reject the code 
version of fact pleading and Twomb!ys pleading standard is a far ciy from that. The Twombly 
Court does not insist that every fact essential to liability be alleged clearly and precisely, nor does it 
insist that the complaint contain only allegations of ultimate fact rather than legal conclusions or 
evidence."). 
30. See, e.g., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT 
WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CI1Y 69 (Edward H. 
Hammond ed., 1939) ("If you were to say, even under these rules, 'I am suing ''X'' because he 
caused me injuiy by negligence,' I would say that that is more general than is permitted by these 
rules." (remarks of Charles Clark)). 
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understatement cannot be squared with the Court's insistence that plausibility 
requires that liability be a more likely explanation than lawful altematives31 and 
that conclusory allegations be disregarded without any clear explanation of how 
one might so label allegations in a consistent and principled manner,32 notwith­
standing the purported endurance of the assumption-of - truth principle.33 Add in 
the Court's direction that judges are now to use their 'J udicial experience and 
common sense" to assess the plausibility of allegations in a complaint,34 and you 
have the makings of a doctrine that not one of the drafters of Rule 8 would 
recognize as their own creation. 
Certainly, it is true that----as some argue--the concept of"notice pleading" 
itself is not found in Rule 8(a) but rather was suggested in Conley v. Gibson, a 
Supreme Court decision interpreting Rule 8: "[Rule 8(a)(2)] does not refer to 
notice pleading explicitly. The term 'notice pleading' was in common use at the 
time to refer to the most liberal pleading standard, so if notice pleading were 
intended, one might have expected the text of the Rule or the Committee Note 
to say so. "35 Thus, the argument goes, the Supreme Court was not only within its 
rights to abandon the concept, but the concept itself has no claim to representing 
the original intent of the Rule. 36 Although it is correct to say that Rule 8 does not 
mention notice pleading, the term is merely shorthand for what the drafters 
intended the Rule to accomplish in contradistinction to the functions of pleading 
under prior regimes. There is no indication that Rule 8 was intended to serve as a 
screening mechanism; original rules committee reporter Charles Clark expressly 
31 . Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 ("[W ]hen allegations of paralle l  conduct are se t out in orde r to make a § 
1 claim, the y must be placed in a context that raise s a sugge stion of a pre ceding ag reement, not 
mere ly para lle l conduct that could just as wel be independent acti on."). 
32. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 699 ( Soute r, J., disse nting) ( "[T]he maj ority' s holdi ng that the stateme nts it 
se le cts are conclusory cannot be squared with its tre atme nt of ce rtain othe r allegations in the 
complaint as nonconclusory."). 
33. A. Benj amin Spe nce r, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L .  
REV. 185, 192 ( 2010) (" Iqbal is a cle ar challe nge to the continuing vitality of the assumption-of ­
truth ru le g iven the Court' s poorly explained  re je ction of what we re unde niably alleg ations that we re 
non-conclusory and fa ctual in natu re ."). 
34 . Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ( "De te rmining whe the r a complaint states a plausible claim for relief wi ll . . .  
be a conte xt-spe cific task that requi re s the re viewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common se nse. "). 
35. Bone , supra note 10, at 892 ; id. at 893 ( "Rule 8(a) came to stand clearl y  fo r  notice ple ading mai nly 
through  judicial inte rpre tations of the Rule ."). 
36 . Id. at 893 ("If notice ple ading is best understood as a judicial inte rpre tation of Rule 8( a)(2 ), then it is 
hardly illeg iti mate for the Court to rev isit thi s earlie r interpre tation and qualify or re vi se it."). 
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disclaimed such a purpose as inappropriate37 and indicated that other rules were 
designed to fulfill that function.38 Initiating the case and informing one's op­
ponent of the nature of the purported controversy in a manner sufficient to form a 
response-a notification function-is what the concept of notice pleading de­
scribes. 39 The more important point, however, is not whether notice pleading is 
the proper label for what Rule 8 requires but rather whether the Court post­
Twombly and Iqbal is requiring of a complaint more than what Rule 8 originally 
required. The answer to that question is clearly yes. Distinguishing between 
factual and legal allegations and assessing the plausibility of a set of allegations in 
light of one's "j udicial experience and common sense" find their heritage-if 
37 . Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.RD . 45, 46--47 ( 1957) (''I fear that eveiy 
age must learn its lesson that spec ial pleading cannot be made to do the service of trial and that li ve 
issues between active liti gants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings, i.e., the 
form alistic claims of the parties. Exp erience has found no quick and easy short cu t  for trials in cases 
generally and antitr ust cases in particular. Much time and expense, waste motion and injustice have 
gone into the attempt, but experience is wholly clear that such quicki e justice always breaks  down . .  
. . "). 
38 . Charl es E .  Clark ,  Simplified Pleading, 2 F.RD . 456, 467 (1943) ("If a claim or defense is legally 
stated, then the matter of particularizati on should be foregone. The parties are pro tected by dis­
coveiy, pre-trial, and summary judgment.") . The Supreme Court itself has shared thi s view: 
O ther provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proc edure are inextric ably 
li nked to Rule 8( a)' s simplified notice pleading standard. Rule 8( e)(l ) states that 
" [n] o  tec hnic al forms of pleading or motions are requi red, " and Rule 8(£) provides 
that " [a] ll pleadings shal l be so construed as to do substantial justic e." Given the 
Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, "[ a] court may dismiss a complaint 
only i f  it is c lear that no reli ef could be granted under any set of fac ts that could be 
proved consistent with the allegations." If a pleading fails to spec ify the allegations 
in a manner that provides sufficient notic e, a defendant can move for a more defini te 
statement under Rule 12( e) before responding. Moreover, c lai ms lack ing merit may 
be dealt with through summary judgm ent under Rule 56. 
Swierki ewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (20 0 2) ( alterations in original) (citation 
om itted) . 
39 . Clark described "the notice function of pleading[]" as follows: 
[Notice] cannot be defined so literally as to mean all the detai ls of the parties' 
claims, or else the rule is no advance. The notice in m ind is rather that of the 
general nature of the case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so 
as to differentiate it from other acts or events, to inform the opponent of the affair or 
transaction to be li tigated- but not of detai ls which he should ascertain for himself 
in preparing his defense-and to tell the court of the broad outlines of the case. 
Thus it serves the purposes referred to above of routing the case through proper 
court channels for the c hoice of juiy or other form of trial and the like, and, 
ultimately, for the application of res judicata to the final judgment rendered. 
Clark ,  supra note 38, at 460-6 1. 
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anywhere-in pleading under the codes,40 not in Rule 8's language or intended 
meamng. 
Even if the original drafters were open to the concept of heightened plead­
ing as a means of merits screening, they clearly did not infuse Rule 8(a) with that 
purpose; Rule 9(6) was the vehicle through which they imposed particularized 
pleading.41 Thus, as the Court itself has acknowledged, by singling out fraud and 
mistake allegations for particularized pleading, the drafters clearly indicated that 
such pleading was not expected elsewhere.42 To now claim that generalizing 
heightened pleading across all claim types is consistent with Rule 8(a)(2) thus 
makes little sense. In short, although the drafters, if resurrected, might consent to 
a reform such as the one that Twombly and Iqbal have imposed as a proper and 
pragmatic response to the realities of modern litigation, that in no way means they 
would endorse the notion that the words they placed within Rule 8(a) meant such 
things all along. Procedural rules "should be continually changed and improved,"43 
but through the established process for amending the Rules formally.44 
II. TuEINCONSEQUENTIALITYDEFENSE 
A second theme among apologists is that the effects of the revis10n to 
pleading standards ushered in by Twombly and Iqbal have been negligible, meaning 
that concern over the change is much ado about little or nothing. Here again we 
confront multiple variants of this defense. 
40. Code pleading refers to the procedural regime in state courts beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
centwy and was the successor to common law pleading. See CLARK, supra note 1, at21- 31 .  Code 
pleading was exemplifi.ed by the Field Code, N.Y. CODE PROC. (1848). See Stephen N. Subrin, 
David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 311  (1988). 
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(6) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circum­
stances constituting fraud or mistake."). 
42. On this point, the Court wrote as follows: 
"[T]he Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(6) the question of the need for greater 
particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated 
actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983. 
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Just as Rule 9(6) makes no mention of municipal 
liability . . .  neither does it refer to employment discrimination. Thus, complaints in 
these cases, as in most others, must satisfy only the simple requirements of Rule 8(a). 
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
43. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of]ustice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q297, 304 (1938). 
44. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 ('Whatever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal 
Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits. A 
requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that 'must be obtained by the 
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation."' (citation omitted)). 
A Response to Twiqbal Apologists 
A. lnconsequentiality Version 1 :  Aligning Doctrinal Change With 
Preexisting Lower Court Heightened Pleading Approaches Means 
That Impact Wil l  Be Minimal 
1721 
The first version is the claim that Twombly and Iqbal are in line with what 
lower courts were doing already,45 making change at the Supreme Court level 
inconsequential for most l itigants. As an initial matter, there are legitimacy 
concerns about how the Court made this change that are overlooked by this 
version of the inconsequentiality defense. Although it is certainly true that lower 
courts had continually imposed heightened pleading for some time in certain 
types of cases,46 the Supreme Court had rebuffed these efforts and indicated their 
impropriety with a unanimous voice.47 For the Court now to acquiesce to lower 
court disobedience in this area simply rewards their insubordination. Seeing 
what happened in Twombly, lower courts may be encouraged to persist in delin­
quent interpretations with the hope that the Court wil l one day follow their lead 
as it did in that case. More importantly, if trying to rewrite Rule 8(a) was law­
lessness when done by the lower courts----as the Supreme Court said it was--then 
it is no more legitimate at the hands of the Court itself, notwithstanding its au­
thority over the rule promulgation process.48 The rulemaking process exists for a 
reason, and the Court should adhere to it in order to give notice of an impending 
45. Bri an T. Fi tzpatri ck, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 8 7  NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1621, 1622 
(2012) ("Twombly and Iqbal may not be nearl y  as revoluti onary as firs t  meets the eye; as a practical 
matter, lower federal courts long ago elevated pleading standards in the face of the ex ponential 
increases in di scovery costs fa ced by corporate defendants."). 
46 . See Christopher M. Fai rman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L .  REV. 98 7, 988 (20 0 3) 
("Notwithstandi ng its fo undation in the Federal Rules and repeated Supreme Court imprimatu r, 
notice pleading i s  a myth. From antitrust to envi ronmental li tigation, conspiracy to copy right, 
substance speci fi c  areas of law are riddled with requirements of particulariz ed fa ct-based pleadi ng .  
T o  be sure, federal courts recite the mantra of notice pleading with amazi ng regularity. However, 
their rhetoric does not match the reality of federal pleading practice." (footnote omitted)). 
4 7 .  See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (holding, by a unanimous opinion, that " imposing the Court of 
Appeals' heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases confli cts with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a)(2)"); L eatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 50 7 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ('We think that it is impossible to square the 
'heightened pleading standard' applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of 
'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules."). 
48 . Professor Fi tzpatri ck makes thi s point, suggesti ng that the Court' s  authori ty to approve or rej ect 
amendments to the Rules means that the Court was not usurp ing authority in any meaningfu l way. 
Fitzpatrick, supra note 45, at 1636 n.92 (" [N]othing prevents the political branches from overru ling 
Twombly and Iqbal now; thus, to the ex tent Twombly and Iqbal usurp ed some power of the political 
branches, it was a relatively minor one: the power to overru le a change  before (rather than merely 
aft er) the change  takes effect."). 
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change, enable commenters and empirics to influence the change, and permit 
experts to weigh in on how the proposed change might affect the system as a 
whole, all points that Professors Stephen Y eazell and Kevin Clermont have made 
previously.49 Plus, the amendment route is more honest, because it confesses that 
a change is taking place, something the Court has yet to acknowledge respecting 
its Twiqbal jurisprudence. 
Further, endorsing plausibility pleading at the Supreme Court level has 
been disruptive to the Federal Rules system because Rule 8(a) and its previous 
interpretation were part of a carefully calibrated system of rules designed to 
address the concerns that lower courts and now the Supreme Court have smug­
gled into the pleading phase. Rule 8(e) calls for construing pleadings to do 
justice,50 Rule 9(6) calls for the "general[]" pleading of allegations of malice, intent, 
knowledge, and conditions of the mind,51 Rule 1 1(6)(3) contemplates and 
permits allegations that lack factual support to be made if so labeled and if 
discovery is likely to fill in the gaps,52 Rule 12(e) permits a motion for a more 
definite statement when the statement of the claim is insufficiently precise to 
provide the requisite notice that would permit the defendant to form a response,53 
and Rule 84 approves of a set of forms that indicate factual specificity is not 
required to support legal allegations such as a "negligent" collision.54 Indeed, 
then-Justice Rehnquist cited the existence of notice pleading as buttressing and 
necessitating his reinterpretation of the Rule 56 summary judgment standard in 
Celotex.55 Twombly and Iqbal destabilized this system by creating a dissonance 
49 . Cle rmont & Ye azel l, supra note 9, at 850 ( "[B]efore discarding the ple ading sys tem that has bee n  in 
place for many ye ars, we ought to discuss its virtue s  and fail ure s sobe rly and with the re levant 
information be fore us. The ru le making bodie s  shoul d  have hoste d  that discussion. Twombly 
and Iqbal short-circuite d  any such discussion. The se case s worked the ir re form by a proce ss­
adjudication- that is hardly the preferred path to de sign change .") . 
50. FED .  R. CIV .  P. 8(e) . Formerl y, the ru le requ ired that courts do "substantial" justice ; this word was 
eliminate d  during the 2007 re styl ing of the Rule s. FED . R. CIV.  P. 8(e) (2006) ( repe aled 2007) . 
51 . FED .  R. Crv .  P. 9(6) . 
5 2. FED.  R. Crv .  P. 11(6)(3) .  
5 3. FED .  R. CIV .  P. 12(e) . 
5 4. FED .  R. CIV .  P. 84; FED . R. Crv .  P. Form 11. 
55. Ce lotex Corp. v. Catre tt, 477 U.S. 317 ( 1986) .  
Before the shift to "notice ple ading" accomplished by the Fede ral Ru le s, motions to 
dismiss a complaint or to str ike a defense we re the principal tools by which factu ally 
insuffi cie nt claims or defense s cou ld be isolated and preve nted from g oing to trial with 
the atte ndant unwarranted consumption of public and private re source s. But with the 
adve nt of "notice ple ading, " the motion to dismiss se ldom fu1fills this fu nction any more, 
and its place has bee n  taken by the motion for summary judg me nt. 
Id. at 327. 
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between Rule 8(a)'s new meaning and other rules continuing to support a liberal 
pleading regime. This tension will have to be resolved through litigation or 
through efforts by the rulemakers to amend the Rules to eliminate the dissonance. 56 
More to the point, however, this iteration of the inconsequentiality defense 
is flawed because although lower courts may have been imposing heightened 
pleading in certain cases, they were not doing it in all cases and they were not 
doing it the way that Twombly and Iqbal now require. Heightened pleading was 
restricted to certain "disfavored" actions, including civil rights, employment 
discrimination, antitrust, and RICO claims.57 As Iqbal made clear, Twombly's 
plausibility standard applies to all cases.58 Indeed, there are lower courts that are 
applying the Twiqbal standard to the pleading of affirmative defenses.59 Further, 
no lower court had gone beyond requiring fact pleading60 toward the monstrosity 
that is plausibility pleading. Under Twombly and Iqbal, judges are to use their 
experience and their common sense to determine whether a claim is "plausible," 
after setting aside allegations deemed conclusory according to some undefined 
56 . For example, at i ts No vember 2012 meeti ng, the Advi sor y Co mmi ttee o n  Civi l Rules had "Rule 8 4: 
Pro po sal to A brogate" o n  i ts agenda, ci ting the tension between the official forms and the Twombly 
and Iqbal deci sio ns. ADVISORY COMM . ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK 7, 40 7 (20 12) , 
available at http://ww w.usco ur ts.go v/ usco ur ts/RulesA ndPoli ci es/r ules/ A genda%20Book s/Civi l/ 
CV2012-10 .pd£ 
57 . Chri sto pher M. Fairman helpfu lly reviewed thi s pheno meno n  in Heightened Pleading, 8 1  TEx.  L. 
REV. 551 (20 02). E arly in that pi ece, foo tno te 6 li sts a few examples of ty pes of actions that have 
been held to requi re heightened pleading standards: Gold v. Morrison- Knudsen Co., 68 F. 3d 1475, 
1476 (2d Cir. 1995) (qui tam) ; Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F. 2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 198 4) 
(antitru st) ; Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 90 0 (D . Mass. 1991) (CERCLA) ; North 
jersey Secretarial School, Inc. v. McKiernan, 713 F. Supp. 577, 58 4 (S.D .N.Y. 198 9) (co nspiracy) ; 
Saine v. A.I.A. , Inc., 58 2 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D . Colo . 198 4) (RICO) ; Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. 
Supp. 621, 622 (N.D . Io wa 1963) (defamatio n) .  Id. at 551 n.6. 
58 . A shcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 68 4 (20 09) ("O ur decisio n in Twombly expounded the pleading 
standard for ' all civil actio ns' . . . .  ") . 
59 . See, e.g., Smithvi l e 169 v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. ,  No . 4: 11-CV-08 72-DGK, 2012 WL 
13677, at *1 (W.D. Mo . Jan. 4, 2012) ('T his Court, like a majo rity of district courts, has held that 
the Iqbal standard applies to affirm ative defenses.") ; Burn s v. Do deka, LLC, No . 4: 09-CV-19-BJ, 
20 10 WL 190398 7, at *1 (ND. Tex. May 11, 20 10) (" [T]he Co urt co ncludes the defendant' s 
affirm ative defenses o f  proxi mate cause and fa ilure to mitigate are who l y co ncluso ry and fai l to 
plead any facts that demo nstrate the plausibility o f  such defenses as required by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly and its pro geny." (citatio n o mitted)) . 
60. See, e.g., McKiernan, 713 F. Supp. at 58 4 ("[T] he complaint fail s to allege fa cts whi ch sho w i njur y to 
co mpetition, as distinct fro m inj ury to a co mpetito r. No vio latio n  o f  Sectio n 1 o f  the Sherman Act 
is po ssible absent proof of anti-co mpetitive effect beyo nd the injury to plaintifls, and facts must be 
pl eaded from whi ch such ef ect can be i nferred." (quoting Jarmatt Tr ucking Leasing Corp. v. 
Brooklyn Pie Co ., 525 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E .D .N.Y. 198 1)) .  
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standard.61 This level of subjectivity was foreign to the pre-Twombly heightened 
pleading approaches and will yield a level of unpredictability that assures incon­
sistent results while encouraging increased motion practice as more defendants 
attempt to obtain a dismissal under these ill-defined standards.62 Such a result 
was borne out by the Federal Judicial Center's (FJC's) recent motion to dismiss 
study, which found a general increase since Twombly and Iqbal in the incidence of 
filing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.63 
A district court case decided after Iqbal illustrates this point. Branham v. 
Dolgencorp, Inc. 64 was a slip-and-fall case removed from Virginia state court to the 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiff alleged in 
her complaint that she "fell due to the negligence of the Defendants . . .  who 
negligently failed to remove the liquid from the floor and had negligently failed to 
place warning signs to alert and warn the Plaintiff of the wet floor. "65 The de­
fendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and the court 
granted the motion. 66 In doing so, the court wrote: 
In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that show 
how the liquid came to be on the floor, whether the Defendant knew or 
should have known of the presence of the liquid, or how the Plaintiffs 
accident occurred. Without such allegations, the Plaintiff cannot show 
that she has a "right to relief above the speculative level." While 
consistent with the possibility of the Defendant's liability, the Plaintiffs 
conclusory allegations that the Defendant was negligent because there 
was liquid on the flood [sic], but that the Defendant failed to remove 
the liquid or warn her ofits presence are insufficient to state a plausible 
claim for relief.67 
Two things are clear. First, prior to Twombly, not one single court would 
have treated this plaintiffs complaint as insufficient under the Conley inter-
61 . Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("De te rmining whe the r a complaint state s a plausib le claim for re lie f wi ll . . .  
be a conte xt-spe cific task that require s the re viewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common se nse ."). 
6 2. This point has bee n sugge sted b y  Profe ssors Ye azell and Cle rmont: ''In mere ly de scrib ing the 
Supreme Court's new te st, we all b ut e stab lished  that its me aning is veiy unclear. At a minimum, the 
fo ggine ss warn s  that any defe ndant's lawye r . . .  commits le gal malpractice i f he or she fails to move to 
dismiss with liberal citations to Twombly and Iqbal " Cle rmont & Ye aze ll, supra note 9, at 840. 
6 3. 2011 FJC STIJDY, supra note 13, at vii ("There was a general increase from 20 0 6  to 2010 in the rate 
of fil ing of motions to dismiss for fa ilure to state a claim . . . .  "). 
64 . No. 6: 09-CV-0 0 0 37, 20 09  WL 260444 7 (W .D .  Va. Aug. 24, 20 09). 
65 . The e ntire ty of the plaintiff s complaint is reproduce d  in the Appendi x. 
66 .  Branham, 20 09 WL 26044 47, at *3. 
67 . Id at *2 ( citations omitted). 
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pretation of Rule 8(a) . Second, even courts that had embraced heightened 
pleading previously would not have considered applying such a standard to a basic 
slip-and-fall negligence case. To the extent more stringent pleading now perme­
ates across all case types, such is a change that will shift the pleading landscape 
among the lower courts beyond where they stood before Twombly. 
B. lnconsequentiality Version 2: Studies Show That There Has Been No 
Practical Adverse Impact 
The second version of the inconsequentiality argument is based on a set of 
empirical studies purporting to demonstrate how little Twombly and Iqbal have 
impacted litigation outcomes. The most prominent study along these lines was 
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, which demonstrated that overall 
motion to dismiss grant rates had not risen significantly in the period following 
the decisions,68 leading the researchers to conclude that Twombly and Iqbal were 
not having the impact on outcomes supposed by many.69 This conclusion was 
reached notwithstanding the researchers' findings that the rate at which motions 
to dismiss were being filed had increased.70 There are several problems with this 
conclusion. 71 
68. See 2011 FJC STUDY, supra note 13, at vii ('There was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at 
which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case . . . .  "). 
69. See id at 16 ("[I]f the district courts were inteipreting Twombly and Iqbal to significantly foreclose 
the opportunity for further litigation in the case, we would expect to see an increase in cases 
terminated soon after the order. However, . . .  we found no statistically significant increase in 2010 
in the percentage of cases terminated in 30 days, 60 days, or 90 days after the order granting the 
motion. Nor did we find differences in termination rates across individual types of cases."). 
7 0. See id at 21 ('The data show a general increase in the rate at which motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim were filed in the first 90 days of the case."). For a useful analysis of the FJC's data, see 
Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing  the Effects effwombly and Iqbal 
on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2326-27 (2012), stating, "Among total other cases, the 
filing rate increased from 3.1% to 5.00/4. For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, the 
12(6)(6) MTD filing rate increased from 6.90/4 to 9.0 percent, and from 10.8% to 12.1%, 
respectively." 
71. One problem that I do not address here has been extensively treated by Professor Lonny Hoffinan, 
who criticized the FJC study from a technical/statistical perspective. See Lonny Hoffinan, 
Twombly and Iqbals M easure: A n  Assessment of the Federal judicial Centers Study of Motions to 
Dismiss, 6 FED. COURTS L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) ('The problem with this inteipretation of the study's 
findings is that it is greatly, if unintentionally, misleading. By summarily announcing that the 
observed increases were not statistically significant, but not explaining what that technical 
terminology means (and, as importantly, what it does not mean), the study confuses readers into 
thinking that it demonstrated the Court's decisions had no impact on dismissal practice."). 
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It is worth pointing out that to the extent that an increase in the incidence of 
motions to dismiss is the product of the raising of pleading standards, more 
plaintiffs are having to respond to such motions than before, with a larger raw 
number of plaintiffs not surviving the motion to dismiss stage. Thus, one po­
tential consequence worth taking into account is the impact of Twombly and Iqbal 
on motion to dismiss filing rates, not just grant rates. Were it the case that an 
increase in motion to dismiss filing rates could be connected with the new 
pleading standard, that itself would be a sufficient cause for concern, as an 
increase in motions raises costs (expense and delay) for those plaintiffs and 
expands the number of plaintiffs who fail to gain access to discovery and to a reso­
lution on the merits.72 
More importantly, grant rate comparisons are inadequate because that mea­
sure neglects the impact that the doctrinal change has had on party behavior, 
which can have a major impact on aggregate motion to dismiss outcomes that 
may not be apparent in grant rates alone. Jonah Gelbach has done some of the 
most useful analysis on this point. As Gelbach notes, changes to legal rules not only 
can implicate judicial behavior but can affect party behavior,73 meaning that an 
increase in the cost of litigation can deter some plaintiffs from bringing their cases 
because of the impact that change has on the expected net benefit associated with 
their claims.74 Similarly, changes to the pleading standard will result in more 
defendants choosing to file motions to dismiss (rather than answering or settling) 
because the expected benefit from doing so has increased. 75 So when we look at 
7 2. Were we able to have confidence that these disaffected plaintiffs had meritless claims, then this 
result would not be lamentable. H owever , as wi l  be discussed below in Part  III, the plausibili ty 
standard  does not screen out meritless claims or even doubtfu l  c laims but simply claims that have 
unanswer ed questions. 
7 3. Gelbach, supra note 70, at 23 05 (" Simple comparisons of adjud icative  results, like how oft en 
plaintiffs win at tri al, tend to mix together (i) the effects of changes in legal rules on cases that would 
be li tigated regard less of the choice of legal ru les and ( ii) changes in case composition that result 
from the change in legal rules. Party selection thus lurks beneath the empirical surfa ce, laying a 
trap for researchers who try to measure the effects of changes in legal rules using before-and­
after comparisons of v ariables that seem to measure outcomes of interest." (footnote omitted) ). 
7 4. Id at 23 06-- 07 (" Such plaintiff selection oc=s in cases where a switch to heightened pleading 
increases a plaintiff s perceived probability that a motion to dismiss would be granted against her 
complaint. The plaintiff s net exp ected gains from litigating wil  fa ll if she thinks the defendant 
might fi le an MID . Some plaintiffs will choose not to file their cases in the first place as a result of 
this reduction in net expected gains from litigating.") .  
75. A s  Gelbach writes: 
Suppose that a change in procedural rules increases each party' s perceived proba­
bili ty that a motion to dismiss would be granted---a s many observers, and v irtually 
all cr itic s, thi nk Twombly and Iqbal do. D efendants wil  beli eve their returns to 
fil ing MTD s have  r isen. A s  a result, under Twombly/Iqbal they wil  file MTD s 
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the grant rates under current pleading standards compared with prior to 
Twombly, current rates could be the product of changed judicial behavior, party 
selection, or both.76 As a result, "the simple possibility that party selection exists 
renders comparisons of [ motion to dismiss] grant rates across pleading regimes 
an unreliable measure of judicial behavior effects. "77 The existing empirical lit­
erature does not and cannot measure the impact that plausibility pleading has on 
plaintiffs' (and their lawyers') decisions to file a lawsuit in the first place or 
defendants' decisions to file a motion to dismiss. 
Nevertheless, Gelbach has attempted to calculate the lower bound on the 
share of claims that have been negatively impacted by Twombly and Iqbal. To do 
this, Gelbach constructs a correction factor that takes into account selection 
effects, reaching the conclusion that at least 18.1  percent of civil rights cases, 15.4 
percent of employment discrimination cases, and 21 .5 percent of all other cases 
were negatively affected by Twombly and Iqbal, meaning at least those 
percentages of claimants would not have had motions to dismiss granted against 
them had the pleading regime not changed.78 As a mere lawyer, I am not 
qualified to assess the strength of Gelbach's statistical analysis. What is clear, 
however, is that we need better studies designed to capture that which we can 
know regarding the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on judicial and party behavior. 
Looking at motion to dismiss grant rates alone certainly cannot give us an 
against some complai nts that they would answer under Con/,ry------ there wi ll be some 
defendant selection. 
Id. at 2306 . 
7 6 .  Gelbach explains th is as follows: Were we able t o  say that a motion to dism iss granted post­
Twiqbal may have been denied under Conley, that would reveal the judi ci al behavi or effects of the 
two cases. Id. at 2301. However, changes in party behavi or must be taken into account as well , 
meaning that some defendants wi ll fil e motions to di smiss post-Twiqbal that they would not have 
filed previ ously; when this happens, a certai n proportion of those additional motions wi ll be 
granted, adding to the total dism issals faced by plaintiffs. Id. at 2311-13. If the motions that 
would not ha ve been fi led under Conley but are now fi led have a lower success rate, the overall grant 
rate would actually go down. Id. at 2313. For example if 5 out of 10 motions were granted before 
Twombly, but after Twombly 3 additional motions are fil ed that would not have been with a 1 out of 
3 success rate, the pre-Twombly grant rate would be 50 percent and the post Twombly rate would be 
6 out of 13, 46 percent. See id. at 2312- 14 (using different numbers to illustrate the point) .  Thus, 
as Gelbach notes, 'Without more information about party behavior, neither the direction nor the 
magnitude of the d ifference in MTD grant rates across pleading reg imes tells us anyth ing about the 
magnitude of any judicial behavior effects. O n  its face, then, the exi sting empirical literature on 
Twombly/Iqbal cannot tell us much about judicial behavior effects." Id. at 2314. 
7 7 .  Id. at 2311; see also id. at 2329 ("[l] n the presence of defendant selection, even such a nul l findi ng 
need not contrad ict the hyp othesis that Twombly and Iqbal have harmed plaintiffs or reduced 
di scovery access."). 
78 . Id. at 2331. 
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accurate picture, although there are emerging studies that show that if one 
analyzes grant rates properly, a post-Twiqbal increase can indeed be detected, 
contrary to the findings of the FJC.79 Surveys of district judges might provide 
some insight into at least whether judges believe they are evaluating pleadings 
differently under those two cases than under Conley. Attorney surveys might 
similarly reveal whether Twombly and Iqbal have impacted case intake decisions 
and motion to dismiss filing decisions. 
More broadly, we also need to recognize the limits of empirics. Given what 
we cannot know-the actual judicial behavior and party selection effects under 
the two competing regimes80-our evaluation of the merits and of the impact 
of the doctrinal revision cannot be based solely on such methods. The impact on 
litigation cost, outcomes, and decisionmaking must be considered alongside nor­
mative concerns, including the propriety of judicial revision of the standard, the 
efficacy of the new standard in relation to its stated objectives, and the policy 
implications behind a plausibility-based screening mechanism vis-a-vis our ul­
timate objectives for the procedural system. This wider array of consequences 
will be discussed in Part III below. 
Ill. THE EFFICIENCYDEFENSE 
The last in this review of the Twiqbal apologia are those defenders that not 
only recognize the change-they laud it. The suggestion here is that the reality 
and the threat of discovery abuse, or at least its enormous expense, empower 
tenuous or meritless claims to yield extortionate settlements.81 Thus, from this 
perspective, a corrective was in order to prevent such claims from accessing 
7 9 .  Profe ssor A lex Re inert i s  in the proce ss of comple ting such a study, which wil l  soon be pub lished . 
A lexande r A. Reinert, Me asuring Iqbal ( unpubl ished manuscript) ( on file with author). 
80. Ge lb ach labels this conundru m the "fund amental e valuation prob lem." Gelb ach, supra note 70, at 
2295 (" [W]e cannot know what would have happened to case s that actua lly have MTD s fi led 
unde r Conley had Twombly! Iqbal actua lly been in place, and so on. This quandary b oils d own to the 
ob se rvation that it is impossib le to ob se rve what would happen to the same unit of study in multiple 
mutua lly e xclusive state s of the world---a challenge known in the e va luation me thodology lite rature 
as the fu nd amenta l e valuation prob lem."). 
81 . See, e.g., Bone , supra note 10, at 88 7 ("If me ritle ss plaintiffs in a large treb le-d amage s class action are 
ab le to ge t past the ple ad ing stage and use the thre at of d iscove ry to leve rage a large se ttle ment, the 
re sult might d isrupt competition in the te le communications marke t, which would be d ire ctly 
contrary to antitrust goa ls."); see also, e.g., Be ll Atl. Corp .  v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007) 
(" The require ment of a lle gations sugge sting an agreeme nt se rve s the pra ctica l purp ose of preventing 
a plaintiff with ' a  large ly ground le ss claim' from 'tak[ing] up the time of a number of othe r  people, 
with the right to do so repre senting an in terrorem incre me nt of the se ttle me nt value ."' (alte ration in 
original)). 
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discovery until they can pay the new price of admission-a demonstration of factual 
support sufficient to render their claims plausible. Perhaps Professor Douglas 
Smith best expressed this view when he wrote: 
The Court's recent pleading decisions recognize that, as the costs 
of litigation increase and the scope of discovery expands, the need for 
more stringent pleading standards increases. It is neither efficient nor 
fair to allow claims of dubious merit to proceed when doing so may lead 
to settlements that are not based on the underlying merits, but rather 
the potential costs associated with defending a lawsuit in our modern 
civil justice system. Iqbal thus presents a further evolution in the 
pleading standard that is likely to increase the efficiency and fairness of 
modern civil practice.82 
First, the Court has not established that the discovery abuse about which it 
is concerned is a real problem in actual cases, or at least in a significant number of 
cases. In support of its theory of discovery abuse, the Court indicated that 
discovery costs were "unusually high" in antitrust cases83 and that discovery 
accounts for "as much as 90 percent of the litigation costs in the cases where 
discovery is actively employed. "84 The former point was based on a citation to a 
student law review note that itself did not cite or engage in any study to back up 
the claim of higher discovery costs in antitrust cases.85 However, even if it turned 
out that the statement was accurate, that would establish a problem for antitrust 
claims, not all types of claims. Thus, if antitrust discovery abuse is the problem, 
the solution should be tailored to that specific context. The latter point the 
Twombly Court made about the costs of discovery, of course, tells us nothing: If 
discovery accounts for 90 percent of litigation costs, that does not mean that the 
costs are high as an absolute matter. Further, there is no clarity in what the Court 
meant by limiting the figure to cases in which discovery is "actively employed. " 
The source of the Court's figure, a memorandum from the Chair of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules to the Chair of the Standing Committee, stated: 
[T]he Committee learned that in almost 40% of federal cases, 
discO'Very is not used at all, and in an additional substantial percentage of 
82. Smith, supra note 26, at 1055. 
83. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect rf One-Way Fee 
Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898- 99 (2003)). 
84. Id at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 
to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 11,  1999), 192 
F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)). 
85. See Wagener, supra note 83, at 1898- 99 ("[C]ourts typically permit antitrust discovery to range 
further (and costs to run higher) than in most other cases."). 
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cases, only about three hours of discovery occurs. In short, the discovery 
rules are relevant to only a limited portion of cases in which discovery is 
actively employed by the parties. In these cases, however, discovery was 
often thought to be too expensive, and concerns about undue expense 
were expressed by both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys. The Com­
mittee learned that the cost of discovery represents approximately 50% 
of the litigation costs in all cases, and as much as 90% of the litigation 
costs in the cases where discovery is actively employed. 86 
So the very source cited by the Court in support of its claim of a discovery 
problem itself admits that discovery is nonexistent in 40 percent of the cases and is 
limited to three hours in a substantial additional percentage of cases; the 90 
percent figure represents what might be taking place at the margins.
87 Using that 
information to generalize an assertion of a discovery abuse problem warranting 
system-wide revision to pleading standards is dubious to say the least. Although 
Professor Linda Mullenix famously debunked what she called "The Pervasive 
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse,"88 the myth clearly continues to hold sway. 
86 . Memorandum from Paul V. Ni emeyer, Chair, Advi sory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony 
J. Sciri ca, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 84, at 357 ( emphasi s 
added). The Feder al Judi cial Center engaged i n  a study of discover y practi ces ahead of the cited 
Advi sor y Committee report i n  whi ch i t  stated the fol lowing: 
E mpir ical r esear ch about discover y  i n  ci vi l li tigati on has yi elded results that 
differ fr om the conventional wisdom, whi ch clai ms that di scovery i s  abusi ve, time­
consuming, unproducti ve, and too costly. In contrast to thi s pi cture of discover y, 
empirical r esearch over the last three decades has shown consistently that 
volumi nous di scovery  tends to be related to case char acteri stics such as complexity 
and case type, that the typi cal case has relatively litt le discover y, conducted at costs 
that are proporti onate to the stakes of the li tigation, and that discover y generally-­
but wi th notable exceptions- yields i nformation that aids i n  the just di sposi tion of 
cases. The results of the FJC study r epor ted i n  thi s Article are, for the most par t, 
consi stent with those findi ngs. 
Thomas E. W illging et al. , An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 
Federal Rule Amendments ,  39 B. C. L. REV. 525, 527 ( 1998) (fo otnotes omi tted). 
87 . Memorandum from Paul V. Ni emeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony 
J. Scirica, Chai r, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 84, at 357; see also Linda S. 
Mulleni x, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B. C. L. REV. 683, 683 
( 1998) ("[T] he studi es reaffirm our common sense notions about di scovery- that complex, high­
stakes liti gation, handled by bi g firms with corporate cli ents, are the cases most li kely to i nvolve the 
problematic di scovery that skews th e  discovery debate. "). 
88 . Linda S. Mulleni x, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the 
Consequences far Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN.  L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1994) ("[T] he massi ve 
di scovery reform agenda un leashed si multaneously through the Advisory Committee on Ci vil 
Rules, the CJRA, and executive branch order s  i s  based on questionable social sci ence, ' cosmi c 
anecdote, ' and pervasi ve, medi a-per petuated myths." ( footnote omi tt ed)). 
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The Federal Judicial Center has since conducted a more recent study of 
discovery in civil litigation, yielding remarkably similar results failing to dem­
onstrate a discovery cost or abuse problem across all or even most cases.89 One 
commentator recounted the FJC's presentation of its results at a 2010 Duke Civil 
Litigation Conference: 
The Duke Civil Litigation Conference opened with a panel 
presenting the empirical data that had been compiled expressly to shed 
light on the conference's concerns with electronic discovery, cost, and 
delay. Yet when the researchers from the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) 
took their seats that morning, their findings were not as expected. To 
the disbelief of many at this venerable gathering, the FJC reported 
that the median cost of litigation for defendants was $20,000, 
including attorneys' fees. For plaintiffs, the median cost was even less, 
at $15,000, with some reporting costs ofless than $1600. Only at the 
ninety- fifth percentile did reported costs reach $280,000 for plaintiffs 
and $300,000 for defendants. The median estimate of stakes in the 
litigation for plaintiffs was $160,000, with estimates ranging from 
$15,000 at the tenth percentile to almost $4 million at the ninety-fifth 
percentile. The median estimate of the stakes by defendants' attorneys 
was $200,000, with estimates ranging from $15,000 at the tenth 
percentile to $5 million at the ninety-fifth percentile. Furthermore, the 
discovery costs that animated the Duke Conference organizers and 
participants did not appear to be, in the vast majority of cases, 
significant or disproportionate. The FJC study found that the median 
percentage of litigation costs incurred in discovery was twenty percent 
for plaintiffs and twenty- seven percent for defendants. Perhaps most 
surprising was the finding that, at the median, the reported costs of 
discovery, including attorneys' fees, constituted 1.6% of the reported 
stakes for plaintiffs and 3.3% of the reported stakes for defendants.90 
These numbers speak for themselves; pleading reform in the interest of 
combating discovery cost and abuse looks like a solution in search of a problem. 
Moving beyond whether the concerns identified by the Court are real or 
imagined, the efficiency argument that plausibility pleading is a good thing also 
fails because the doctrine as articulated is poorly designed to achieve the 
89. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT 
TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009), http:// 
www.fjc.gov/publidpd£nsfi1ookup/dissurvl .pdil$file/dissurvl.pd£ 
90. Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil justice Reform: Its Fallacies and 
Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1088- 89 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
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screening goal it espouses.91 As I said at the outset of this piece and as I have 
written before, plausibility pleading is overinclusive92 and hopelessly subjective.93 
A complaint that has enough facts to make entitlement to relief a possibility but 
not enough to render it plausible is not one that anyone can rightly label 
frivolous, meritless, or even dubious, at least not solely on the basis of the 
plausibility analysis. Indeed, the fact that liability is possible is acknowledged 
under the standard; possibility, however, no longer suffices.94 After seeing Iqbal 
and not liking the result, Professor Robert Bone-a Twombly defender­
acknowledged that plausibility pleading "risks screening meritorious suits"95 and 
that the policy case for doing so, at least in cases like Iqbal, is "uncertain. "96 
Perhaps arguments can be made that raising the pleading bar to block potentially 
meritorious claims is justifiable under certain circumstances. But neither the 
Court nor any commentator has made the case that the costs to defendants, to 
the litigation system, or to substantive legal concerns of permitting such claims to 
go forward are so great as to warrant denying a prospective litigant meaningful 
access to the courts, either in particular substantive contexts or across all cases 
generally. And as Professor Bone has suggested, there are better ways to protect 
these interests: "[E] ven in Iqbal, strict pleading might not have been the best way 
to achieve an optimal policy balance. The lower courts offered a promising 
alternative: thin screening followed by limited access to discovery before 
subjecting the case to a more aggressive screening approach. "97 Professors Y eazell 
91. Professor Fitzpatrick has been critical of the Twombly/Iqbal solution to the discovery problem. See 
Fitzpatrick, supr a note 45, at 1643 ("This is not to say, however, that the regulatory mechanism the 
Court selected to tighten the spigot on discovery- pleading standards- is the best one. Pleading 
standards empower judges who have neither the information nor the incentives to make wise 
decisions about which cases are worthy of discovery."). 
92. See supra note 7. 
93. See supra note 8. 
94. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545-46 (2007) ("A parallel conduct allegation gets the § 
1 complaint close to stating a claim, but without further factual enhancement it stops short of the 
line between possibility and plausibility."). 
95. Bone, supra note 11, at 879 ("[S]trict pleading will screen some meritorious suits, even ones with a 
high probability of trial success but a probability that is not evident at the pleading stage before 
access to discovery."). 
96. Id at 881. 
97. Id at 878-81; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 57 4, 598 (1998) ("Rule 26 [ of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure] vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly and 
to dictate the sequence of discovery."). This is the approach the district court proposed to take in 
Iqbal. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *21 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) ('The personal involvement, if any, of the non- MDC defendants 
should be the subject of the initial stage of discovery. Accordingly, discovery concerning Ashcroft, 
the FBI Defendants (Mueller, Maxwell, and Rolince), and the BOP Defendants (Sawyer, 
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and Clermont have alluded to the possibility of beefed-up enforcement of Rule 
1 1  as an alternative.98 Justice Stevens was not short of ideas beyond pleading 
stringency in his Twombly dissent.99 To target pleading standards-the very 
front end of the system-as the solution to a perceived problem with discovery 
seems misguided. 
Additionally, the subjectivity of the plausibil ity standard cannot be denied. 
What does plausibility mean? All we know is that it means more than possibility 
and less than probability, 100 if even that much is clear.101 As the understanding of 
this amorphous term will vary from judge to judge, inconsistent and inappropriate 
applications of the doctrine are inevitable.102 Further, the plausibility determi­
nation depends on having judges apply their own understanding of what is 
"normal" or "ordinary'' behavior for various actors-using, in Justice Kennedy's 
words, their 'J udicial experience and common sense"103-as the lens through 
which they determine whether a plaintiffs allegations describe a factual scenario 
Cooksey, and Rardin) wil l be general ly l imited to inquiries into their involvement in the al leged 
denials of due process.") . 
98 . See Clermont & Yeaz ell , supra note 9, at 8 49 ("[O] ne could have less disruptively attained an 
equivalent of the Twombly and Iqbal regime by aggressively rereading Rule 11 rather than Rule 8 .") . 
99 . Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Those concern s merit careful case 
management, including strict control of discovery, carefu l scrutiny of evidence at the summary 
judgment stage, and lucid instructions to juries; they do not, however, justify the dism issal of an 
adequately pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers deny ing a 
charge that they in fa ct engaged in collective decisionmak ing.") . 
100. A shcroft v. I qbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (20 09) ('The plausibil ity standard is not ak in to a 'probabil ity 
requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibil ity that a defendant has acted unlawfully.") ;  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 ("A sk ing for  plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a 
probabil ity requirement at the pleading stage . . . .  ") . 
101. Judge Posner has opined that there is no clarity in the Court' s  possibil ity -plausibil ity-probabil ity 
trichotomy, writing as fol lows: 
The Court said in Iqbal that the "plausibility standard is not akin to a 'prob­
abil ity requirement, ' but it asks for more than a sheer possibil ity that a defendant has 
acted unlawfully." This is a l ittle unclear because plausibil ity, probabil ity, and 
possibil ity overlap. Probabil ity runs the gamut from a zero l ikel ihood to a certainty. 
W hat is impossible has a z ero l ikelihood of occurring and what is plausible has a 
moderately high likel ihood of occurring. The fa ct that the al legations undergirding 
a claim could be true is no longer enough to save a complaint from being 
dismissed; the complaint must establish a nonnegligible probability that the 
claim is valid; but the probability need not be as great as such terms as 
"preponderance of the evidence" connote. 
In re Text Messaging Antitrust L itig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (citation om itted) . 
102 . Clermont & Yeaz ell , supra note 9, at 8 41-42 ('The second step of measuring plausibil ity seems 
even more obviously unclear. This measure l ies entirely in the mind of the beholder. A nd the 
multitude of beholders, wearing judicial robes, has precious l ittl e interp retive guidance given the 
measure's novelty in the law." (footnote om itted)) . 
103. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
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suggestive of wrongdoing.104 This is, by definition, a subjective assessment 
because it is based on opinion rather than fact. In  other words, given the con­
cession by the Court in both Twombly and Iqbal that the allegations were consistent 
with liability on the part of the defendants, the Court applied its opinion prefer­
encing lawful explanations above unlawful ones based solely on its own 
speculation regarding which of the two was more likely. Were the described 
events flatly inconsistent with liability, that would have been an objective 
determination that would have legitimately supported dismissals in those cases. 
But a pronouncement that "this could have been unlawful but we're not con­
vinced because what you describe is more often the product of normal, lawful 
conduct'' is not the blocking of unmeritorious claims, but the blocking of merely 
questionable ones. 
What is wrong with screening out merely questionable claims? Once we 
make normalcy in the eyes of the judge the standard against which allegations of 
wrongdoing are evaluated, we perversely disadvantage challenges to the very 
deviance our laws prohibit. A civil claim is all about deviation from the norm, 
which has happened many times in history-even at the hands of good capitalist 
enterprises and high-ranking government officials. While businesses and govern­
ment officials may normally not do the wrong thing, sometimes ( or perhaps 
often) they do.105 When that happens, they certainly are not going to leave clear 
breadcrumbs for outsiders to expose them. All we may see are the fruits of their 
wrongdoing, which in tum will be all that can be alleged in a complaint. Without 
the opportunity to initiate an action that asserts deviance in the context of 
seemingly normal behavior, such wrongdoing will go undiscovered and 
unpunished. A llowing such claims to move forward does not have to mean that 
the floodgates to abusive discovery are opened. Courts can and should force 
plaintiffs with questionable claims to identify the narrow areas that they would 
104. Bone describes this as comparing plaintiffs' claims against a "baseline of normality." Bone, supra note 
10, at 878 ("[T]he Court's plausibility standard . . .  requires no more than that the allegations describe 
a state of affairs that differs significantly from a baseline of normality and supports a probability of 
wrongdoing greater than the background probability for situations of the same general type."). I 
have described Twombly as requiring "the presentation of a factual scenario that possesses a 
presumption of impropriety based on objective facts and supported implications." Spencer, supra 
note 7, at 18. 
105. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Many years ago a truly great economist 
perceptively observed that '[p ]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment 
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance 
to raise prices."' (alteration in original) (quoting 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
117 CT- M. Dent & Sons ed. 1960) (1776))). 
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need to explore to make their claims more tenable before further discovery is 
permitted.106 Judges could also use their authority to shift the costs of such 
discovery to minimize the burden on defendants at this stage.107 But shutting 
down such claims ab initio is not the right approach. And doing it through 
judicial reinterpretation just makes it even worse, given the legitimacy and 
disruption concerns outlined above.108 
CONCLUSION 
Both the substance of the plausibility doctrine and the means by which it 
has been imposed are indefensible, assuming one cares about enabling private 
litigants to vindicate substantive law violations through the courts. Certainly, as 
Professor Bone reminds us, defendants have a right "to be free from liability when 
the substantive law so provides, " and that can serve as a counterweight to the rights 
of plaintiffs to have legitimate claims vindicated. 109 However, no one can seriously 
claim that requiring an answer to a complaint-and perhaps some limited 
discovery-is the equivalent of imposing liability on innocent defendants. Thus, 
invoking pleading doctrine as a means to protect such defendants is undeniable 
overkill. 
To the extent that Twiqbal defenders have faith in plausibility pleading as 
something that will be useful in helping to weed out unmeritorious claims, they 
refuse to learn the lessons of the past, just as Charles Clark predicted and la­
mented. 110 The combination of requiring facts raising the prospect of liabil ity 
106. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front L oading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-dismissal Discovery Can 
Address the Detrimental Effect eflqbal on Civil Rights Cases, l 4 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 69 
(2010) ("Although courts should continue to guard against 'fishing expeditions,' they should also be 
open, upon receipt of a Rule 12(6)(6) motion, to allowing plaintiffs some initial discovery focused 
on those discrete facts necessary to show a plausible claim. This way, discovery would be loaded 
towards the front end of the lawsuit, and would be doing heavy lifung of a different kind­
determining the lawsuit's viability rather than its underlying merits. "). 
107. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(6). 
108. See supra Part II.A. 
109. Bone, supra note 10, at 913; see also Celotex Coip. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Rule 56 
must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses 
that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the 
rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by 
the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis."). 
110. Clark, supra note 37, at 46--47 ("I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading 
cannot be made to do the service of trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be 
disposed of or evaded on the paper pleadings, i.e., the formalistic claims of the parties. Experience 
has found no quick and easy short cut for trials in cases generally and antitrust cases in particular. 
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beyond the speculative level to that of plausibility and empowering judges to 
disregard what they deem to be legal conclusions rather than factual assertions, 
makes plausibility pleading no better than the very fact-based code pleading 
system the Federal Rules replaced. 111 If the abandoned code pleading system can 
be described as "nineteenth-century judges [who] applied the code rules in a 
hyper-technical fashion, insisting on ' strict and logical accuracy' and drawing 
hopeless distinctions among allegations of ultimate fact, legal conclusions, and 
evidentiary facts, "112 how is pleading post-Iqbal much different? Justice Kennedy 
saw conclusions (the allegation of policy design and approval) where Justice 
Souter saw facts;113 Justice Souter saw conclusions (the allegation of an 
agreement) where Justice Stevens saw facts.1 14 Who is right? What will the 
judge in your next case see?115 
It is interesting that as one looks across the landscape of Twiqbal apologies, 
Twombly and Iqbal are simultaneously downplayed as inconsequential but de­
fended as necessary to fight discovery abuse and extortionate settlements. They 
can't be both. But such duplicity, in truth, is telling. The liberal ethos of the 
Rules is an important part of their legitimacy. Overt and honest efforts to ratchet 
back their open-access orientation are difficult to achieve; this may be because it is 
very difficult to sell procedural revisions that explicitly move in an access­
restricting direction and that do so unapologetically in the interest of defendants 
at the expense of aggrieved prospective plaintiffs. Thus, the most substantial 
antiaccess procedural reforms have occurred through judicial reinterpretation of 
the Rules, reliably combined with assurances that (1) nothing has changed 
doctrinally and (2) there will be or has been no impact of the interpretation in 
Much time and e xpense , waste motion and inj ustice have gone in to the attempt, b ut experience is 
whol y  cle ar that such quickie justice al ways b reaks down . . . .  ") . 
111 .  See Mi lle r, supra n ote 4, at 2 0  ( describ in g  the ple adin g stan dard e stab lished b y  Twomb{yand Iqbal as 
" [i]n re ality . . . a form of fact pleading b y  anothe r n ame"). 
112 . Bone , supra n ote 10 , at 8 91. 
113. Ashcroft v. Iqb al, 556 U.S. 662 , 68 1, 698 (2 009) .  
114 . Bel A tl .  Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 590 (2 0 0 7) .  
115 . Alex Re ine rt, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 1, 10 (2 0 12) 
("[L ] ower courts have disagreed as to whe the r allegation s  which fail to distingu ish amon g 
defen dan ts are b y  de finition conclusory or not.") .  
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question,116 while the rhetoric behind the reinterpretation roots itself in the need 
to protect defendants against frivolous or doubtful claims.117 
As I have written previously, Twombly and Iqbal are part of a series of cases 
moving civil procedure in a restrictive direction.118 From summary judgment,119 
to pleading, to personal jurisdiction, 120 to class action doctrine, 121 the Court has 
reinterpreted procedural rules in ways that protect corporate or government de­
fendants against suits by individual plaintiffs. Some may believe that is a good 
thing. I tend to disagree. But if restrictiveness is the chosen course, those who 
espouse it should be decent and courageous enough to clearly articulate that vi­
sion and advance it through the rulemaking and legislative process on those 
terms, so that the rationale and approach can be publicly defended and debated. 
I, for one, would pursue the abandonment of plausibility pleading by urging the 
rulemakers to restore notice pleading122 and revise other complementary Rules­
such as Rules 9(6) (particularity requirement) , 11 (certification requirement) , 12(e) 
(motion for a more definite statement) , 16 Gudicial case management) , 26 
(discovery in general) , 37 (discovery sanctions) , and the Official Forms-to de­
velop a more thoughtful, comprehensive, and effective approach to controlling 
initiation of actions and access to discovery. 
At the outset of this Conclusion, I noted that plausibility pleading is inde­
fensible, "assuming one cares about enabling private litigants to vindicate substan­
tive law violations through the courts. " Ultimately, it may be that some defenders 
116 . See, e. g. , JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TRENDS IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PRACTICE: 1975- 2000, at 23- 24 (2007) ,  http:// www.fj c.gov/public/pd£ns6'looku p/t:rsj prll 7.pdfi' 
$fil e/t:r sj prll 7.pdf (finding that the rate of filing and g ran ting surnrrnuy judgmen t  motion s "generally 
changed veiy li ttle after the [ Celotex] tri logy" ). 
117 . See, e.g. , C elotex C orp. v. C atrett , 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ( "Rule 56 mu st be con stru ed with du e 
reg ard n ot only for the rights of person s asserting claims and defen ses that are adequ ately based in 
fact to have those claims and defen ses tried to a juiy, bu t also fo r  the rights of person s  opposing su ch 
claims and defenses . . . .  "). 
118 . E. g. , A. Ben jamin Spen cer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 
B.U. L .  REV. 441, 475 - 78 (2013) (describing this tren d) ;  A. Ben jamin Spen cer, The Restrictive 
Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH . L .  REV. 353 (2010). 
119 . Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson v. L iberty Lo bby, In c., 477 U. S. 242, 257 (1986) ;  Matsu shita 
E lec. Indu s. C o. v. Z en ith Radio C orp ., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986) .  
120. J. McIn tyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. C t. 2780 (2011) ( denying personal ju risdi cti on over a 
defen dant who indirectl y shipped a produ ct cau sing harm to the plain tiff in the fo rum state). 
121 .  Wal-Mart Stores, In c. v. Dukes, 131 S. C t. 2541 (2011) (in terpreting the " common qu estion s" 
requ irement of Ru le 23( a) to requ ire common qu estion s that are central to the litig ation). 
1 22. A possible way to do this wou ld be to amen d Ru le 8(a) (2) to read "a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing the possibi li ty of reli ef " Note that su ch a revision wou ld have to be 
accompani ed by chang es to the other ru les enumerated in the text. 
1738 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710 (2013) 
of Twombly and Iqbal simply do not fully embrace that goal. My hope is that this 
goal can at least be kept in mind as the Supreme Court and others who influence 
federal civil procedure interpret and apply plausibility pleading going forward. 
A Response to Twiqbal Apologists 
APPENDIX 
V I R G i N I A: 
HOLLY BRANHAM, 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF AMHERST 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DOLGEN CORP, INC. 
d/b/a/ Dollar General Store 
a Kentucky ColJ)OratiOn 
SERVICE REGISTERED AGENT 
Corporation Service Company 
1 1  South 12th Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 




I. On June 8, 2007, the Plaintiff, was severely and permanently injured when she fell a1 Dollar General Store at 
171 Ambriar Plaza in Amherst Cmmty, Virginia. The store was owned and operated by the Defendant and 
employees and agents of the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff fell due to the negligence of the Defendants agents and employees who negligently failed to 
remove the liquid from the floor and had negligently failed to place warning signs to alert and warn the 
Plaintiff of the wet floor. The Defendants thru its employees breached their duty to warn the Plaintiff of the 
dangerous wet floor. 
3. As a direct result of the negligence of the Defendants agents and employees, acting in the scope of their 
employment, the Plaintiff was severely and pennanently injured. She lost many of the pleasures of life. She 
suffered pain. She has incurred medical and hospital bills. Her ability to earn an income was dissipated. 
4. The Plaintiff seeks a judgment in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) against the 
Defundant. 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF /3Jt 3G 
Robert S. Ganey, Esq. 
P.O. Box 174 
Hanover, VA 23069 
(804) 627-2723 
HOLLY BRANHAM 
